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Avoiding Antitrust and FCPA Traps



PRESENTER



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- Career highlight: Successfully argued antitrust appeal before noted Judge Richard Posner




Today's Agenda

Antitrust

- Basic laws
- Vertical vs. horizontal
- Per se vs. Rule of Reason
- Enforcement/Penalties

FCPA

- Basic rules
- Who's covered
- Enforcement/Penalties
- Mitigating Risk






Antitrust: What's It All About, Anyway?



Father of U.S. Antitrust Law



Senator John Sherman

- The Ohio Icicle
- General Sherman's brother
- Sherman Act passed in 1890
 - Senate approved 51-1
 - Unanimous House
- Intended to "nullify contracts that . . . increase price of articles, and thereby diminish the amount of commerce."



Basic Antitrust Statutes

Sherman Act (1890)

- §1: outlaws "contracts, combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade"
- §2: monopolization, attempt/conspiracy to monopolize

Clayton Act (1914)

- Targets "mergers substantially lessening competition"
- Hart-Scott-Rodino premerger notification
- Created private right of action
- Robinson-Patman Act (price discrimination)
- Competitor corporate interlocks

Federal Trade Commission Act (amended 1938)

Targets "unfair methods of competition"



Sherman Act Section 1

- Outlaws contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce
- Requires concerted action by 2 or more firms
 - There must be an "agreement"
- Covers horizontal and vertical arrangements
 - Horizontal: firms the compete at same level of distribution
 - Vertical: firms at different levels of distribution chain
- Read literally, would prohibit many innocuous and commonplace business arrangements
 - Exclusive supply contracts
- Courts have narrowed §1 to agreements that <u>unreasonably</u> restrain trade



Two Approaches to Determining "Unreasonable"

• Per Se Rule

- Horizontal agreements that always, or almost always, restrict output or raise price
- Illegal without regard to purpose or effect
- Subject to criminal enforcement
- Rule of Reason
 - Agreements that might restrict output or raise price, but might be neutral or even pro-competitive
 - Balances competitive effects of the agreement
 - Includes all vertical agreements and many horizontal agreements with some pro-competitive effect



Examples of *Per Se* Section 1 Violations

Price Fixing

- Example: Managers of LodgeCo and StayCo agree that price of king room in downtown Atlanta will be \$225
- Example: Procurement managers of LodgeCo and StayCo agree on max. price <u>they will pay</u> for bath soap

Agreement on Terms Affecting Price

 Example: New Orleans Hotel Ass'n votes that minimum-stay during Super Bowl should be 4 nights

Market or Customer Allocation

 Example: LodgeCo agrees not to enter Orlando market if StayCo agrees not to enter Las Vegas market



More *Per Se* Examples

Bid Rigging

- Example: coordinated bids on convention business
- Example: LodgeCo agrees not to bid for new convention center hotel project sought by StayCo

Restricting Competition for Talent

 Example: agreement not to solicit employees of competitors to fill open positions

Group Boycotts — law muddled, but why risk it?

 Example: three large hotel chains agree not to do business with particular in-room Internet provider



What Constitutes An "Agreement"?

- Agreement need not be formal or in writing
- Agreement can be proved by:
 - Emails
 - Telephone calls
 - Discussion at trade association meeting
 - Conversations at social gatherings
 - "Hub-and-spoke" conspiracy
 - "Invitation to collude" through public statements
 - Parallel conduct with a "plus factor"
- Unilateral "price matching" is lawful—but can you prove it was truly unilateral?
- <u>Every</u> communication with a competitor regarding sensitive subjects creates antitrust risk



Rule of Reason Example: Resale Price Maintenance

- RPM: <u>vertical</u> agreement between firms at different levels of the market to set a price floor
- Pre-2007: RPM agreements were per se illegal
- Leegin (2007):
 - Supreme Court recognized that economic literature "is replete with procompetitive justifications" for RPM
 - New rule: courts must balance the net procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of RPM in each case

Factors:

- Number of firms in market engaged in RPM
- Who was driving force: manufacturer or retailers?
- Does any party have market power?



Rule of Reason Example: Resale Price Maintenance

- Online Travel Co. MDL Litigation (MDL 2405)
 - Accuses OTAs of using their dominance to impose minimum pricing on major hotel chains
 - "Rate Partity" policies embodied in Retailer-Hotel Contracts

Issues:

- Who drove adoption of Rate Parity?
- Unilateral vs. Coordination decisions?
- Agency Model vs. Merchant/Wholesale Model
- Proof of Damages

RPM still per se illegal under law of some states

California, Maryland, Kansas



Antitrust Enforcers

- DOJ
- FTC
- State AGs
- Private Plaintiffs
 - Aggrieved competitors
 - Overcharged customers
- Enforcement tactics
 - Wire taps, hidden cameras, informants, extradition
 - Leniency program encourages self-reporting
 - Conviction after trial or guilty plea is prima facie evidence in civil case








Vigorous Enforcement Across Industries

- Construction
- Chemicals
- Vitamins
- Auto parts
- LCD displays
- DRAM
- E-books
- Fine art auction services
- Freight forwarding
- International air travel
- and now . . . Online hotel bookings









U.S. Criminal Antitrust Penalties

- Hard-core violations of Section 1
- Individuals
 - \$1 million fine
 - Up to 10 years in jail
 - Jail time is standard; currently averages 24 months


Company fines

- Greater of:
 - \$100 million, <u>or</u>
 - twice loss to victim or gain to violator
- Company fines exceeding \$100 million not uncommon






Fines Are Real . . .





... And Jail Time Is Increasing



Source: DOJ Antitrust Division Update, Spring 2012

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U.S. <u>Civil</u> Antitrust Penalties



- Civil Enforcement by Government
 - Suits for damages and injunctions by FTC, DOJ and State AG's

Private Civil Litigation

- Suits for treble damages by private plaintiffs injured "by reason of" the violation
- Trebling of damages found by jury is automatic
 - Jury not advised of trebling
 - De-trebling possible in exchange for cooperation
- Losing defendant pays plaintiffs' attorney fees on top of damages



The Global Expansion of Antitrust



Foreign Corrupt Practices Act









Prohibits corrupt payments

- to foreign officials
- for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business, directing business to any person, or securing any "improper advantage."

Two components:

- Anti-bribery
- Recordkeeping and internal controls



Who is Subject to the FCPA?

Anti-bribery provisions apply to:

- U.S. or foreign companies listed on U.S. securities exchanges ("Issuers")
- Other businesses organized in the U.S., and U.S. citizens ("Domestic Concerns")
- Foreign persons who commit any act in furtherance of a corrupt act while in the U.S.
- U.S. citizens who commit any act in furtherance of a corrupt act while outside the U.S.
- Recordkeeping and Internal Control provisions apply to Issuers



Jurisdiction over Non-U.S. Subsidiaries

- A non-U.S. subsidiary of a U.S. parent corporation is not itself subject to the FCPA
- Directors, officers and employees who are U.S. citizens are still subject to the FCPA
- Conduct by the non-U.S. subsidiary may in certain circumstances cause the U.S. parent company to be liable for a violation



Anti-bribery Provisions

FCPA prohibits

- use of the mails or any instrumentality of interstate commerce
- corruptly
- in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of payment of any <u>money</u> or <u>anything of</u> <u>value</u>
- to any <u>foreign official</u>...



Anti-bribery Provisions (Cont'd)

- for the purpose of:
 - influencing the foreign official, or
 - inducing the official to act or omit to act in violation of his lawful duty, or
 - to induce the official to use his influence to affect any act or decision of a foreign government
- in order to:
 - assist the FCPA-covered entity in obtaining or retaining business, or
 - to direct business to any person; or
 - to gain any "improper advantage"



"Anything of Value"


- Cash or cash equivalent
- Gifts or services
- Charitable donations
- Political contributions
- Loans
- Travel expenses
- Sporting events
- Entertainment outings
- Hiring of relatives





Who is a "Foreign Official"

- Elected Officials
- Cabinet Ministers
- Agency Personnel
- Candidates for Office
- Political Parties
- Political Party Officials and Employees
- Management and Employees of State-Owned Enterprises







Recordkeeping Provisions

Every Issuer must:

- "make and keep books, records, and accounts which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of assets" and
- develop and maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls in connection with the forgoing
- Typical violations:
 - Falsified records that disguise improper transactions
 - Records that are quantitatively accurate but fail to identify true purpose of improper payments
 - Off-the-books transactions, such as kickbacks
- Issuer can violate FCPA if <u>foreign subsidiary</u> creates false records and parent incorporates foreign subsidiary's information into its books and records



Penalties for Violations



Criminal (Department of Justice)

- Anti-bribery violations:
 - Individuals may be fined up to \$100,000 and/or imprisoned for up to five years
 - Corporations may be fined up to \$2 million per count
 - Company may not indemnify employees
- Books & records violations (willful)
 - Individuals may be fined up to \$5 million and imprisoned up to 20 years
 - Corporations may be fined up to \$25 million



Penalties for Violations

Civil (SEC)

- Anti-bribery violations:
 - Individuals subject to a civil penalty of \$10,000 per count
 - Company may not indemnify it employees
 - Companies may be fined up to \$2 million per count and subject to a civil penalty of \$10,000

Alternative Fine Statute

• Can increase criminal fines to twice the gross gain or loss

Other adverse consequences

- Disgorgement
- Debarment
- Monitor
- Costs of investigation




Recent Enforcement Trends


- U.S. government has never been more active or aggressive
- More criminal prosecutions and enforcement actions in last 5 years than in prior 20 years combined
- Largest fines and penalties ever assessed
 - Douglas Murphy (American Rice): 5+ years
 - David Kay (American Rice): 3+ years
 - Titan: \$28.5 million
 - Vetco: \$26 million
 - Baker Hughes: \$44 million
 - Chevron: \$30 million



Enforcement Trends: Collaboration Among International Agencies

- Increased collaboration among international agencies
- More European countries have enacted anti-bribery laws
- Trend toward more crossborder investigations and information-sharing





Mitigating Risk: Before

- E&Y Study: 90% of FCPA enforcement cases involve agents
- Use due diligence to determine the trustworthiness and compliance practices of a prospective agent
- Gather as much information as possible from:
 - FCPA Questionnaire
 - Interview of the agent
 - Online sources
 - Interview of references
 - Denied persons lists
 - U.S. Embassy and other government sources
- Increasing number of cases arise in M&A context





Mitigating Risk: During

- Strict adherence to internal controls
- Active and vigorous oversight of FCPA compliance program
- Monitoring third-party relationships
- Updating due diligence periodically, as called for in compliance program
- Auditing
- Alertness to RED FLAGS
 - Questionable situations or suspicious circumstances



Mitigating Risk: After

Internal investigation

- Genuinely independent investigators
- Outside counsel if necessary
- Report violations to Board, Audit
 Committee or other oversight body
- Disciplinary measures for employee violations
- Voluntary self-reporting if warranted





